Abstract -This paper proposes a signature scheme where the signatures are generated by the cooperation of a number of people from a given group of senders and the signatures are verified by a certain number of people from the group of recipients. Shamir's threshold scheme and Schnorr's signature scheme are used to realize the proposed scheme.
Introduction
Physical signature is a natural tool to authenticate the communication, but it is useless in electronic messages; one has to rely on other methods like digital signature. Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to solve this problem of authenticity in electronic communications. Basically digital signature has a property that anyone having a copy of the signature can check its validity by using some publicinformation, but no one else can forge the signature on another document. This property of digital signature is called self-authentication. In most situations, the signer and the verifier is generally a single person. However when the message is sent by one organization to another organization, a valid message may require the approval or consent of several people. In this case, the signature generation and verification is done by more than one consenting rather than by a single person. A common example of this policy is a large bank transaction, which requires the signature of more than one person. Such a policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. Threshold signature is an answer to this problem.
The (t , n) threshold signature schemes [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8] are used to solve these problems. Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt [1, 2] .
In 1991 Desmedt and Frankel [1] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme based on the RSA assumption. This paper proposes a Threshold signature scheme with threshold verification based on Shamir's threshold signature scheme [10] and Schnorr's signature scheme [9] . These basic tools are briefly described in the next section.
The section-2 presents some basic tools. In Section-3 we present a Threshold Signature Scheme with threshold verification. Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration to the scheme is discussed in section-5. Remarks are in section-6.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we will use the following system setting.
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 < p < 2 512 ;
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 < q < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p -1;
• A number g, where g k (p -1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1 k p -1 such that g >1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp * ).
• A collision free one-way hash function h [12] ;
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. Every user has two keys one private and one public. We assume that a user A chooses a random A A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into n users in such a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t -1 or less users reveal nothing about the secret. There are many realization of this scheme, we shall use Shamir's scheme. This scheme is based on Lagrange interpolation in a field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t -1 is randomly chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. Each user i is given a public identity i u and a secret share f ( i u ). Now any subset of t shareholders out of n shareholders can reconstruct the secret K = f (0), by pooling their shares and using
The proposed scheme.
The signer of the conventional digital signature schemes is usually a single person. But when the message is transmitted by an organization S to another organization R and may require the approval of more than one person then the responsibility of signing the messages needs to be shared by a subset H S of t or more signer from a designated group G S of n users belongs to the organization S.
On the other hand, the signing group wants to generate the signature on a message m in such a way that the signature can be verified by any subset H R of k or more users from a designated group G R of l users belongs to the organization R, then threshold verification schemes serve our purpose. This paper proposes a threshold signature scheme with threshold verification.
We assume that the secret key of the organization S is S We further assume that both the organization R and S have a common trusted center (CTC) for determining the group secret parameters of the two groups and also the secret shares all members. This scheme consists of the following steps: -
Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S.
(a). CTC selects the group public parameters p , q , g and a collision free one way hash function h. CTC also selects for the group G S a polynomial
(c). CTC randomly selects K ∈ Zq and computes a public value W = g K − mod p. 
Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization R
(a). CTC selects for the group G R a polynomial 
Signature generation by any t users
If a H S is subset of t members of the organization S out of n members who agree to sign a message m to be sent to the organization R, then the signature generation has the following steps. 
Signature verification by the organization R
Any subset H R of k users from a designated group G R can verify the signature. We assume that there is designated combiner DC (can be any member among the members of the group G R , or the head of the organization R), who collects partial computations from each user in H R and determines the validity of signature. The verifying process is as follows. 
Security discussions.
In this sub-section, we shall discuss the security aspects of proposed Threshold Signature Scheme with threshold verification. Here we shall discuss several possible attacks. But none of these can successfully break our system. (e). Can the designated CTC retrieve any partial information from the equation,
Obviously, it would be computationally infeasible for CTC to derive any information from s i .
(f). Can one impersonate a member i ,i ∈ H S ?
A forger may try to impersonate a shareholder i ,i ∈ H S , by randomly selecting two integers However, according to the one-way property of the hash function h, it is quite impossible.
Thus, this attack will not be successful. . So if in an organization the shareholders are known to each other, any t of them may collude and find the secret polynomial f S . This attack, however, does not weaken the security of our scheme in the sense that the number of users that have to collude in order to forge the signature is not smaller than the threshold value.
Illustration
We now give an illustration in support of our scheme. Suppose 
Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S
(a). CTC selects for the group G S ,a polynomial f S (x) = 11 + 3x +13 x 2 + x 3 mod 23. Here (c). CTC computes the secret key, public key, secret share and public value for each member of the group G S , as shown by the following table. User -R 6 14 13 4 18 32
5.2.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization R (a

